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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Family Court
In Moseley v. Mosier,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that jurisdiction for all domestic matters, which are con-
tained in a decree or in a separation agreement, vests in the
family court. Moseley establishes that the provisions of a separa-
tion agreement, once approved, 2 become part of the divorce de-
cree and thus become modifiable and enforceable by the con-
tempt powers of the family court. Although the decision allows
the parties some latitude to affirmatively deny the family court
jurisdiction over alimony and property settlement provisions, 3
Moseley confirms that the family court retains continuing juris-
diction to modify and to enforce child support provisions, 4 not-
withstanding any separation agreement of the parents. Moseley
extends this long-held position5 to cases involving separation
agreements, bringing South Carolina into line with the general
rule.' However, the decision in Moseley expressly overrules sev-
eral recent cases,7 and questions the continuing viability of sev-
eral others, which address family court jurisdiction over alimony
and property settlement provisions. Moseley appears to import
1. 279 S.C. 348, 306 S.E.2d 624 (1983).
2. Presumably this refers to the fairness test analysis. See infra text accompanying
footnotes 49-92.
3. See infra text accompanying footnotes 42-43.
4. Presumably custody provisions are also included.
5. For cases illustrating the well-established family court authority to modify and
enforce judicially-decreed child support provisions, see Lever v. Lever, 278 S.C. 433, 298
S.E.2d 90 (1982); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276 S.C. 475, 279 S.E.2d 616 (1981); and Smith
v. Smith, 275 S.C. 494, 272 S.E.2d 797 (1980).
6. See Fricks v. Fricks, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963) (cannot withdraw chil-
dren of the marriage from the protective custody of the court); see also, H. CLARK, LAW
OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS, § 16.13, at 561 (1968) ("orders for support of children are al-
ways freely modifiable as changing circumstances may require. This is true whether or
not the order originated in a separation agreement[,] . .. the courts saying that agree-
ments by husband and wife cannot be allowed to control the level of child support").
7. Bryant v. Varat, 278 S.C. 77, 292 S.E.2d 298 (1982); Brooks v. Brooks, 277 S.C.
322, 286 S.E.2d 669 (1982); Kelly v. Edwards, 276 S.C. 368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981).
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recent developments in West Virginia8 and North Carolina9 di-
vorce law into the law of South Carolina.
Older South Carolina cases usually followed a "merger the-
ory" with respect to provisions of a property settlement. Under
this theory, the agreement of the parties became merged into
the decree and lost its contractual nature, thereby allowing the
court to modify the decree upon changed circumstances.10 More
recently, the jurisdiction of the family court has been deter-
mined by an inspection of the "terms of art" used in the agree-
ment. This theory represented an attempt to discover the intent
of the parties to confer jurisdiction on family court. Terms of
art, such as "incorporated and merged," "incorporated without
merger," "ratified,". "adopted," or "approved," controlled the
operation of divorce law. Finding that family court jurisdiction
did not extend to ordinary actions ex contractu, the court de-
nied subject matter jurisdiction to the family court where the
agreement was neither "incorporated or merged"11 or was "in-
corporated but not merged. ' 12 This determination, based on se-
mantic nuances, created considerable confusion in the legal com-
munity while ignoring the basic fact that the parties' intent is
rarely revealed by legal terms of art. Moseley abolishes this con-
fusing terms of art analysis from the family law of South
Carolina.
The divorce decree in Moseley "incorporated by reference,
without merger," the provisions of a property settlement and
separation agreement providing, among other things, for $150 a
week in child support payments and stating that the agreement
"shall not be modified . . . except by written instrument duly
executed by both parties." Following the father's abortive at-
tempt to achieve a reduction in child support payments, 3 the
8. Nakashima v. Nakashima, 297 S.E.2d 208 (W. Va. 1982); In re Estate of Here-
ford, 250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978).
9. Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983); Walters v. Wal-
ters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983).
10. See Fender v. Fender, 256 S.C. 399, 182 S.E.2d 755 (1971); Jeanes v. Jeanes, 225
S.C. 161, 177 S.E.2d 537 (1970); Ex parte Jeter, 193 S.C. 278, 8 S.E.2d 490 (1940).
11. Fielden v. Fielden, 274 S.C. 219, 262 S.E.2d 43 (1980); McGrew v. McGrew, 273
S.C. 556, 257 S.E.2d 743 (1979); Zwerling v. Zwerling, 270 S.C. 685, 255 S.E.2d 850
(1979).
12. Bryant v. Varat, 278 S.C. 77, 292 S.E.2d 298 (1982); Kelly v. Edwards, 276 S.C.
368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981).
13. The father petitioned family court for a decrease in child support upon changed
[Vol. 36
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mother petitioned family court to enforce the terms of the agree-
ment. Although family court held the father in contempt, it de-
ferred sentencing and ordered the father to pay $500 in child
support arrearages. 4 The court also reduced the weekly child
support payments to seventy-five dollars.1
The arguments the parties raised on appeal illustrate the
pre-Moseley uncertainty regarding family court jurisdiction. The
mother argued that since the obligation arose from contract, the
family court had authority only to enforce the terms of the
agreement, not to modify them." The father countered that if
the obligation arose from contract, the family court had no juris-
diction to enforce the terms by its contempt power. 17 In a far
ranging analysis,"' the supreme court reversed the family court's
finding of contempt, and resolved the issue of the subject matter
jurisdiction of family court over child support, property settle-
ments, and alimony provisions based upon separation
agreements.
1. Child Support Jurisdiction
The supreme court clarified the issue of child support based
on agreement by holding that family courts have continuing ju-
risdiction to act in the best interests of the child, regardless of
what the separation agreement specifies.19 Moseley extends the
long-standing family court authority to modify and to enforce
child support awards to situations involving separation agree-
ments. The court cited Smith v. Smith0 for the doctrine that
the family court may always modify child support upon a show-
conditions. The family court found it had jurisdiction only to enforce, not to modify, the
child support provisions based on a contractual agreement. Record at 15. The father's
appeal from this order was abandoned.
14. Total arrearages exceeded $2,000. Record at 49.
15. The court also awarded attorney's fees of $200. The trial court was careful to
note that it was not modifying the terms of the decree, but was simply holding all arrear-
ages in abeyance temporarily. Record at 52.
16. The mother relied on Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612 (1978) (incor-
poration alone is sufficient to allow enforcement by family court).
17. The father relied on Zwerling v. Zwerling, 273 S.C. 292, 255 S.E.2d 850 (1979)
(an "incorporated without merger" agreement is enforceable only by resort to ordinary
contract remedies).
18. 279 S.C. at 351-53, 306 S.E.2d at 626-27.
19. Id. at 351, 306 S.E.2d at 626.
20. 275 S.C. 494, 272 S.E.2d 797 (1980).
1984]
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ing of changed conditions. In that case a judicially decreed
amount of child support was increased because of the extraordi-
nary medical expenses of the child. Although overlooked by the
court, a recent case involving a separation agreement, Lunsford
v. Lunsford,21 supports the court's position that no agreement of
the parties can prejudice the child's rights.22
In Lunsford a settlement agreement incorporated into the
divorce decree released the father from any child support pay-
ments. Holding that neither parent can agree to release the
other from child support obligations, the court stated that the
basic right of minor children to support is not affected by an
agreement between the parents or third parties as to such sup-
port.23 Thus, as the cases of Moseley and Lunsford clearly indi-
cate, questions of child support may not be finally determined
by agreement of the parents, but remain matters under the con-
tinuing jurisdiction and supervision of family court.
2. The Contempt Issue
The supreme court reversed the family court's finding of
contempt on two grounds. First, the court noted that because
the father in Moseley had faithfully paid as much child support
as he could each week, the essential element of willful, contemp-
tuous conduct required by Curlee v. Howle2 ' was not present.
The court further observed that when the supporter is unable to
21. 277 S.C. 104, 282 S.E.2d 861 (1981).
22. See Johnson v. Johnson, 251 S.C. 420, 163 S.E.2d 229 (1968). The court took this
position based on the well-established principle of South Carolina law that the best in-
terest of the child will always receive first consideration in all family court proceedings.
See Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612 (1968).
23. 277 S.C. at 105, 282 S.E.2d at 862. The court went on to find that because the
mother in Lunsford was better able to support the children, the father should not be
ordered to pay child support.
24. 277 S.C. 377, 287 S.E.2d 915 (1982). In Curlee, a father whose children were
visiting him under a court order granting him three week visitation rights, petitioned for
and was granted a Nevada order awarding him temporary custody. The mother peti-
tioned family court in South Carolina to hold the father in contempt. The family court
held the father in civil contempt and on review the supreme court affirmed. The court
applied the common law rule that willful disobedience of a court order results in con-
tempt. Under the broad rubric of Curlee, a defendant may be held in contempt even
when his action is in compliance with a conflicting order of another court. For a discus-
sion of Curlee, see Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 35
S.C.L. REv. 118 (1983).
[Vol. 36
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comply with the terms of an agreement, the child's best interests
are served by decreasing child support rather than by sentencing
the supporter for contempt. 5 Second, the court held that since
the finding of contempt rested on the violation of a support obli-
gation arising out of a separation agreement, and not out of a
court order, the second element of contempt, a valid court order,
was absent.26 As & result, the court noted that on remand the
mother's cause of action should be for breach of contract.
27
3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Family Court over
Property Settlement and Alimony Provisions
The court in Moseley took the opportunity to resolve the
troubling question of the subject matter jurisdiction of family
court respecting matters in a separation agreement other than
child support, typically property settlement and alimony provi-
sions . After tracing the shortcomings of the terms of art analy-
sis, the court announced a new general rule:
Today we overrule those cases which hold that words of art
make a major distinction in the operation of divorce law. Fur-
thermore, jurisdiction for all matters, whether by decree or by
agreement, will vest in the family court .... [W]ith the
court's approval, the terms [of an agreement] become a part of
the decree and are binding on the parties and the court.2 9
This new rule represents a dramatic departure from previous ju-
risprudence by establishing that in the absence of a specific pro-
vision to the contrary, unambiguously denying the family court
jurisdiction in the areas of modification and enforcement,30 it
shall be presumed that the parties intended the terms of the
25. 279 S.C. at 352, 306 S.E.2d at 626.
26. Presumably this statement must be read in the context that Moseley, which es-
tablishes that terms of a separation agreement become part of the divorce decree and are
enforceable like any other order 6f the court, is to have only prospective application. In
his dissent, Chief Justice Lewis strongly argued that the majority opinion's conclusion
that there was no valid court order, in effect, "ignore[d] the plain facts contained in [the]
record." 279 S.C. at 355, 306 S.E.2d at 628 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
27. 279 S.C. at 353, 306 S.E.2d at 626.
28. Note that the court's power to enforce the myriad of other provisions in a sepa-
ration agreement, such as life insurance or health insurance provisions, is not addressed
by Moseley. See infra text accompanying footnotes 46-47.
29. 279 S.C. at 353, 306 S.E.2d at 627.
30. See infra text accompanying footnotes 46-47.
1984]
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agreement to be judicially decreed, and thus subject to the con-
tinuing jurisdiction of the family court.
The court in Moseley reasoned that the terms of art analy-
sis had been an unsatisfactory method of determining jurisdic-
tion, as it generally failed to reveal the parties' true intent and
tended to impose adverse consequences on unsuspecting parties.
The court's analysis closely parallels that of In re Estate of Her-
eford,31 which was cited in the opinion. In Hereford, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia descrbed the terms of
art method of determining subject matter jurisdiction in divorce
cases. 32 Likening terms of art to the small print in contracts of
adhesion, the court abolished the terms of art analysis and
adopted the presumption of continuing jurisdiction mirrored in
Moseley.3
Moseley overrules three prior decisions: Kelly v. Edwards,
3 4
Brooks v. Brooks35 and Bryant v. Varat.36 Kelly and Bryant
held that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over an "incorporated without merger" agreement. These two
cases are thus squarely inconsistent with the new Moseley posi-
tion. However, the court's basis for overruling Brooks is less con-
crete. In Brooks, the parties' separation agreement, which was
approved but not merged into the decree, expressly provided
that the family court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agree-
ment but not to modify any terms other than child support. De-
spite this language, the family court modified the husband's ob-
ligation under the agreement to make automobile lease
payments. 37 In reversing, the supreme court found that the fam-
ily court had exceeded its authority because both the agreement
and order provided that the agreement was not modifiable by
the court except as relating to child support.3 8
31. 250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978).
32. Id. at 50.52.
33. Id. at 51-52.
34. 276 S.C. 368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981).
35. 277 S.C. 322, 286 S.E.2d 669 (1982).
36. 278 S.C. 77, 292 S.E.2d 298 (1982).
37. 277 S.C. at 325-27, 286 S.E.2d at 671-72. The family court in Brooks, however,
refused to hold the husband in contempt. Id. at 325, 286 S.E.2d at 671. Moseley contains
a mistake regarding the family court decision in Brooks: "[W]e confused the matter [in
Brooks] by holding that the family court properly held appellant in contempt." 279 S.C.
at 352, 306 S.E.2d at 626 (emphasis added).
38. 277 S.C. at 326, 286 S.E.2d at 671.
[Vol. 36
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If Brooks is interpreted as an instance in which the parties
unambiguously limited the court's jurisdiction, then the decision
is entirely correct by the new Moseley standard. A few possibili-
ties can be suggested for overruling Brooks. As the court in
Moseley admitted, at the time Brooks was decided, the prevail-
ing law maintained that parties could not confer subject matter
jurisdiction by agreement.3 9 Thus, since Brooks was erroneous
when decided, its overruling in Moseley was perhaps simply an
attempt to remove an inconsistent case from the law. Second,
the court in Moseley was confused regarding the case history of
Brooks,40 and therefore might have misread it as another terms
of art case.41
Moseley recognizes that the broad jurisdiction of family
court may be limited by an unambiguous expression in the
agreement that its terms may not be enforced or altered.42 The
court reasoned that such an expression would bind the family
court and the parties as long as the agreement as a whole was
fair and reasonable.43
Although Moseley clarifies the matter of the family court's
jurisdiction over separation agreements, certain questions re-
main unanswered. One problem concerns the retroactivity of
39. See Cox v. Lunsford, 272 S.C. 527, 252 S.E.2d 918 (1979); 20 Am. JuR. 2d Courts
§ 139 (1965).
40. See supra note 37.
41. In Moseley the appellant, pursuant to Rule 8, § 10 of the Supreme Court Rules
of Practice, filed a Petition to Argue Against Precedent with the court. In this petition,
the appellant requested the court to overrule only the Bryant and Kelly decisions. No
mention was made of the Brooks decision. See Petition to Argue Against Precedent of
Appellant at 5.
42. 279 S.C. at 353, 306 S.E.2d at 627. The court in Moseley sums up this portion of
its holding with the following language:
[The parties may specifically agree that the amount of alimony may never be
modified by the court; they may contract out of any continuing judicial super-
vision of their relationship by the court; they may agree that the periodic pay-
ments or alimony stated in the agreement shall be judically awarded, enforcea-
ble by contempt, but not modifiable by the court; they may agree to any terms
they wish as long as the court deems the contract to have been entered fairly,
voluntarily and reasonably.
Id. This passage, taken almost verbatim from Hereford, curiously omits the following
provision given by the West Virginia court- "[T]hey may agree that a lump sum settle-
ment in lieu of periodic payments shall constitute the final settlement of the rights of the
parties." Although arguably this omission demonstrates some resistance by the South
Carolina court, presumably the blanket allowance to "agree to any terms they wish" is
broad enough to include such a provision.
43. See supra note 42.
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Moseley. Arguably, property settlement agreements entered into
before Moseley should continue to be controlled by the terms of
art analysis, since practitioners and their clients relied on such
terms in attempting to define the court's jurisdiction.
However, if the court, in desiring to eradicate terms of art
analysis as soon as possible, adopts the approach of the West
Virginia 44 and North Carolina45 courts, Moseley will be applied
to all cases in which a final order is entered subsequent to the
decision, regardless of when the underlying property settlement
agreement was signed. Hence, it may be necessary to revise a
number of outstanding property settlement agreements which,
by the use of specific terms of art, were intended to limit the
subject matter jurisdiction of family court.
In addition, whether Moseley creates an equitable remedy
for the violation of other provisions in an agreement, such as a
promise to maintain life or health insurance, remains an open
question. In Hereford, the West Virginia court limited its hold-
ing to periodic payments such as alimony or child support. Ar-
guably, the broad language in Moseley that "jurisdiction for all
domestic matters ' 47 vests in family court invites future litigation
on this point. Despite this expansive language, however, provi-
sions of a property settlement agreement which pertain to the
actual division of real and personal property will probably be
enforceable by family court, but modifiable only on appeal.4 e
In sum, the court in Moseley greatly simplified the issue of
the subject matter jurisdiction of family court over separation
agreements. The new general rule is that unless the parties
unambiguously deny or limit the jurisdiction of family court, a
44. In In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978), decided in December
1978, the court announced that the new standard would be applied to all cases in which
the final order was entered after February 1, 1979.
45. In Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983), the court stated that
the new standard applied to cases in which the final judgment was rendered subsequent
to Walters.
46. 250 S.E.2d at 52.
47. 279 S.C. at 353, 306 S.E.2d at 627.
48. Prior to Moseley, the provisions of a separation agreement relating specifically
to property division were, even in an "incorporated with merger" agreement, enforceable
by family court but modifiable only on appeal. Since Moseley in effect simply presumes
incorporation with merger, those terms relating to property division will still be modifia-
ble only on appeal. The doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to prevent modification
by a lower court.
[Vol. 36
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presumption arises that the parties intended the terms of their
agreement to become part of the divorce decree, enforceable and
modifiable by family court. Although Moseley abolishes terms of
art as the method of establishing the subject matter jurisdiction
of family court, its scope is undefined, and many questions
raised by the decision can only be answered through future
litigation.
B. The Fairness Test
In Lucas v. Lucas"9 the South Carolina Supreme Court con-
tinued to apply the "fairness test" to property settlement agree-
ments. The fairness test, first adopted in Fischl v. Fischl,50 im-
poses a duty on the family court to rule on the fairness of
property settlement agreements in light of the specific facts and
circumstances of each case.51 The court in Lucas rejected the
family court's finding of the fairness of a property settlement
agreement, holding that the agreement, which was entered into
freely and voluntarily52 but without benefit of. counsel, was un-
fair and should be voided. This agreement gave the husband es-
sentially all the marital property while leaving the wife almost
nothing.53 The court in Lucas was especially concerned by the
fact that the wife had made substantial contributions to the
marital property, in addition to performing normal housekeep-
ing duties.5 4 In light of this concern, the court added to the
traditional fairness test a requirement that the family court per-
form both an equitable distribution 5 and a special equity anal-
ysis before ruling on the fairness of an agreement. The decision
also emphasized that each party should receive advice from in-
dependent counsel before entering into any agreement.
49. - S.C. -, 302 S.E.2d 863 (1983).
50. 272 S.C. 297, 251 S.E.2d 743 (1978).
51. Id. at 300, 251 S.E.2d at 745. See also Drawdy v. Drawdy, 275 S.C. 76, 268
S.E.2d 30 (1980) and McKinney v. McKinney, 274 S.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 526 (1980) for
further clarification of the fairness test.
52. Record at 71.
53. - S.C. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 865.
54. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864. The court noted, "There can be no doubt but that
her contributions to the marital properties was substantial over and above normal wifely
duties in the home." Id. at _ 302 S.E.2d at 864.
55. See infra text accompanying footnotes 80-85.
56. Id.
1984]
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The wife in Lucas sued for divorce on the ground of physi-
cal cruelty,57 seeking custody, child support, alimony, attorney's
fees and an equitable distribution of the real and personal mari-
tal property.5 8 The husband conceded the custody issue but con-
tested the remaining matters, interposing a property settlement
agreement as a defense to the alimony and property division
claims. 9 This agreement, denominated a "final and complete
settlement of all the property rights, '6 0 gave the wife only a used
care' and a few personal possessions,6 2 while allowing the hus-
band to retain the marital home valued at $25,000.3 The wife,
who was unrepresented by counsel," further released the hus-
band from alimony or any claim for independent maintenance
and support.6 5
At trial the wife presented evidence concerning the alleged
physical cruelty of her husband and her contributions to the
marital property.66 The husband failed to testify or to offer con-
flicting evidence.6 7 The family court refused to grant the divorce
on the ground of physical cruelty, and the wife's complaint was
amended to request a divorce on the ground of one year's sepa-
ration.6 8 The trial judge then perfunctorily performed his duty
under Fischl to review the agreement for fairness,6 finding the
agreement "fair, just and equitable on its face. '70 The divorce
was granted on the ground of one year's separation, thereby
foreclosing the wife's claims for alimony, equitable distribution
and attorney's fees.
57. - S.C. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864.
58. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864.
59. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864.
60. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 865.
61. The car had 87,000 miles accumulated on it. Record at 46.
62. - S.C. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 865.
63. Record at 67.
64. - S.C. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864. The lawyer drafting the agreement had been
selected by the husband. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864.
65. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 865.
66. Record at 41. The wife testified that during the seventeen year marriage she had
earned approximately fifty-three thousand dollars, and that the couple, who shared all
expenses, had spent twenty thousand dollars improving the marital residence. Record at
27.
67. - S.C. at , 302 S.E.2d at 864.
68. Id. at ., 302 S.E.2d at 864. The divorce was granted upon this ground.
69. Record at 10.
70. Id. at 75.
140 [Vol. 36
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While noting that "it is difficult to fathom the reason for
denying the divorce on the ground of physical cruelty, 7 1 the su-
preme court refused to upset the lower court's discretion on this
point, deciding instead to reverse the family court's conclusion
on the fairness of the agreement. Among the factors demonstrat-
ing unfairness were: (1) the absence of independent advice to
the wife before she entered into the agreement, (2) the emo-
tional condition of the wife,7 2 and (3) the lack of adequate pro-
vision for the wife both in property division and alimony, in
view of the wife's substantial contributions. The court remanded
the case for a new trial on the matters of equitable distribution,
alimony and attorney's fees.78
The court relied on Drawdy v. Drawdy7 4 for the proposition
that an examination of the agreement in light of the economic
circumstances and contributions of each party is essential to
performing the fairness test. Drawdy established Family Court
Rule 1975 as a means by which family court judges may obtain
the financial information necessary to ensure that separation
agreements are fair. In Lucas, the husband failed to testify and
the trial record indicated that the husband's financial statement
was not introduced until after the family court had decided the
fairness question.7 Therefore, the supreme court found the re-
view of relative economic circumstances required by Drawdy to
71. - S.C. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864.
72. The wife's testimony is included in the opinion:
Well, I had real bad nerves and was upset at that time. The house wasn't in my
name anyway, and I had to have a way back and forth, so I just settled for the
car, and then my son came to live with me, and now we don't have anything.
- S.C. at -_, 302 S.E.2d at 864.
73. Id. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 865.
74. 275 S.C. 76, 268 S.E.2d 30 (1980). In Drawdy, the court voided a property settle-
ment agreement which was hastily drawn, contained no provision for a waiver of ali-
mony, and was not signed in contemplation of a final divorce. The court stressed that
family court should go beyond establishing that the agreement was validly executed, and
should receive evidence pertaining to the parties' respective economic circumstances and
contributions. Id. at 77, 268 S.E.2d at 31.
75. A current financial declaration in the form prescribed by Appendix A shall
be served and filed by any petitioner or respondent appearing at any hearing at
which the court is to determine an issue as to which such declaration would be
relevant and so much thereof shall be completed as is appli cable to the issue to
be determined, unless otherwise ordered by the court in which the proceeding
is pending.
S.C. FAMILy CT. R. 19.
76. Record at 89.
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be inadequate, and invalidated the agreement.
Cases applying the fairness test have set forth various pro-
cedures, in addition to a review of the parties' relative economic
conditions, to be followed by the family court when adjudging
the fairness of a property settlement agreement. First, the court
must resolve any ambiguities in the document.7 Second, the
court must pass on the fairness of the agreement by considering
the intentions of the parties, the circumstances of the agree-
ment,78 and the financial situation of the parties. 79 Lucas adds to
this list a requirement that the family court judge undertake an
analysis pursuant to both the special equity and equitable divi-
sion theories before determining the fairness of an agreement. In
Wilson v. Wilson,80 the supreme court applied the special equity
theory of property division. This theory maintains that where a
spouse has made material contributions"' to the acquisition of
property during the marriage, the spouse acquires a special eq-
uity in the property.8 2 In Parrott v. Parrott,s3 which established
the equitable division doctrine in South Carolina, the court
found that services in the form of housekeeping alone over the
course of a lengthy marriage entitled the non-wage-earning
spouse to a division of real and personal property upon divorce.
Although this equitable division doctrine has tended to subsume
the notion of special equity, the contributions necessary to in-
77. McKinney v. McKinney, 274 S.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 526 (1980).
78. Id. at 97, 261 S.E.2d at 527.
79. - S.C. at -, 302 S.E.2d at 864; Drawdy v. Drawdy, 275 S.C. 76, 77, 268 S.E.2d
30, 30 (1980).
80. 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978).
81. The material contributions required under the special equity doctrine include
both financial contributions and contributions of effort to the acquisition of property. In
Wilson, Mrs. Wilson worked outside the home for 24 years of the marriage. In addition
to assisting her husband in his business, she contributed her income to the household
expenses. By contrast, the contributions required under the equitable division doctrine
include homemaking services such as rearing children and performing normal housekeep-
ing duties.
82. McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254 S.C. 372, 172 S.E.2d 628 (1970). Special Equity is
distinguishable from one of its predecessor theories, Resulting Trust. This theory holds
that when a spouse supplies funds or assumes an obligation prior to or at the acquisition
of property, a resulting trust in favor of that party arises. See Parrott v. Parrott, 278 S.C.
60, 62, 292 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1982). Unlike the resulting trust theory, special equity dees
not require that the spouse prove that he or she has contributed to the acquisition of the
specific property being divided. 254 S.C. at 374, 172 S.E.2d at 629.
83. 278 S.C. 60, 292 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
[Vol. 36
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voke the theories differ,8 and in Lucas the court held that the
wife was entitled to participate in the distribution of property
under both special equity and equitable division doctrines.85
Lucas raises a question concerning the duties of fair dealing
and full disclosure assumed by parties entering into separation
agreements when one party is unrepresented by counsel. While
the opinion fails to expressly articulate the imposition of a
fiduciary duty, 6 such an analysis is consistent with prior case
law and the court's decision in Lucas. In other confidential rela-
tionships, such as those existing between parties to prenuptial
agreements, courts have long imposed special duties. In
Batleman v. Rubin,s7 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that engaged persons are under a high obligation to make
full and frank disclosure of all facts concerning the settlement.88
Batleman established a presumption, or burden shifting rule,
that where a prenuptial agreement provided the wife with less
than her marital rights, the agreement had not been presented
with full and fair disclosure.89 The court established competent,
independent advice to the wife as an essential element to the
agreement's validity.90
Other transactions between husbands and wives have im-
84. See supra note 81.
85. - S.C. at , 302 S.E.2d at 865.
86. The fiduciary duties of coadventurers were described in Meinhard v. Salmon,
294 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) by Judge Cardozo:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is the standard of behav-
ior .... Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd.
Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
87. 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957).
88. Id. at 160, 98 S.E.2d at 522.
89. Id. at 161, 98 S.E.2d at 523.
90. Id. at 158, 98 S.E.2d at 521. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 494
P.2d 208 (1977), adopts the approach of Batleman. Describing the relationship between
engaged parties as one of "mutual confidence, and trust,. . . call[ing] for the exercise of
good faith, candor and sincerity," id. at 301, 494 P.2d at 213, the Friedlander court
placed the burden upon the husband to prove full disclosure whenever the agreement
made provision for a wife that was disproportionate to the husband's means. Id., 494
P.2d at 214. The court also stated that in the instant case the agreement was void at its
inception since the wife did not have independent advice before signing the agreement,
which had been prepared by the husband's attorney. Id. at 303, 494 P.2d at 214.
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posed fiduciary duties. The relationship between husband and
wife is considered the most confidential of all relationships, and
all transactions between them must be fair and reasonable to be
valid."' However, when the wife employs an attorney and deals
with the husband as an adversary, the confidential relationship
is terminated. 2 Lucas cautions parties entering into separation
agreements that where one party is without counsel, the other
party shoulders heavy fiduciary duties and bears the burden of
proving the intrinsic fairness of the transaction.
One further question unanswered by Lucas concerns the
status of property settlement agreements which are, by the Wil-
son, Parrott and Drawdy standards, fair when executed at sepa-
ration, but which, because of one spouse's subsequent accumula-
tion of assets, may appear unfair at the time of the divorce
proceeding. The Drawdy requirement of full disclosure of pre-
sent economic circumstances at the divorce proceedings suggests
that even agreements which pass the fairness test at execution
may be vulnerable at the divorce hearing if one party's financial
status has been materially enhanced.
The impact of the fairness test is to heighten uncertainty
91. Cline v. Cline, 297 N.C. 336, 255 S.E.2d 399 (1979); Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181,
179 S.E.2d 697 (1971); Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).
In Marshall v. Marshall, 273 S.E.2d 360 (W. Va. 1980), the wife, at the behest of her
attorney husband and without ever consulting an attorney, conveyed her interest in real
property and stocks to the husband as part of an alleged oral reconciliation agreement.
Id. at 362. When the parties' reconciliation failed and the husband commenced divorce
proceedings, the wife sought to have the transfer voided. The trial court found that the
husband had met his burden of proof in showing that the conveyance was voluntary. Id.
at 361. In reversing, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that the issue
could not be resolved by looking only at the voluntariness aspect, but "must be resolved
in the context of our fiduciary rule to ascertain the essential fairness of the transfer." Id.
at 363. Marshall employed the general rule that where persons occupy a fiduciary or
confidential relationship, the lack of independent advice on the part of the person claim-
ing to be disadvantaged may be a significant factor in the court's evaluation of the pro-
priety of the transaction. Id. Applying this broader fiduciary duty standard, the court
found the husband's action lacking in good faith.
In addition to the absence of counsel for the wife, the court noted several other
factors influencing its decision: (1) The property transfer arose at a time when the mar-
riage was in difficulty and the wife, who was emotionally distraught, was under psychiat-
ric care; (2) the husband, an attorney, must have been aware of the superior legal posi-
tion he would have as a result of the transfer; (3) the husband had imposed a deadline on
the wife to sign the agreement; and (4) the husband's purported reconciliation proved
illusory when he subsequently filed for divorce. Id.
92. Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E.2d 714 (1965); 17A Ai. Jur. Divorce and
Separation § 898 (1957).
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regarding the conclusiveness of a validly executed property set-
tlement. Above all else, practitioners should advise their clients
that agreements concluded without benefit of counsel on one
party's behalf will be especially vulnerable to attack. Practition-
ers should also be keenly aware that all separation agreements
will now be subject to a fairness analysis under both the special
equity and equitable distribution doctrines. Finally, even agree-
ments which fulfill the fairness test at their inception may be
subsequently voided if changed circumstances have materially
increased one spouse's estate.
II. CHILD WELFARE: THE CONTEMPT POWER OF FAMILY COURT
USED TO INCARCERATE CHRONIC STATUS OFFENDERS
In In re Darlene C. 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that under the most egregious circumstances, family courts
may exercise their contempt power to confine a status offender
in secure facilities.9 4 In reaching this decision, the court circum-
vented explicit language of the Children's Code, which provides
that a status offender may not be placed in a detention facility.
5
This decision illustrates the court's determination to deal with a
problem of chronic runaways left unaddressed by the legislature.
The decision extends the use of the family court criminal con-
tempt power to children who disobey valid court orders.96 Al-
though the response of the various courts confronting this prob-
lem has differed, the court's decision is in accord with cases in
several jurisdictions.97
Darlene C., a sixteen year old runaway, was ordered by fam-
ily court to remain in a nonsecure girls' home and to receive
mental health counseling. The court order explicitly stated that
if she failed to obey, she would be held in contempt.9 8 Two days
93. 278 S.C. 664, 301 S.E.2d 136 (1983).
94. Id. at 666, 301 S.E.2d at 137.
95. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-600(d) (Supp. 1983). Under the law of South Carolina, a
status offender is defined as a child who commits an offense which would not be a misde-
meanor or felony if committed by an adult. Id. at § 20-7-30(6) (Supp. 1983).
96. 278 S.C. at 666, 301 S.E.2d at 138.
97. See L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976); R.M.P. v. Jones, 419 So. 2d 618
(Fla. 1982); State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980); State v.
Norlund, 31 Wash. App. 725, 644 P.2d 724 (1982); In re D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168, 327
N.W.2d 682 (1982).
98. 278 S.C. at 665, 301 S.E.2d at 137.
1984]
15
Pillick: Domestic Relations
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
later, Darlene left the home99 and a Rule to Show Cause was
issued by the family court as to why she should not be held in
contempt.100 Darlene appeared at the subsequent hearing but of-
fered no defense;101 the family court found her in criminal con-
tempt, holding that the violation of the previous court order ele-
vated her status to that of a juvenile delinquent.0 2 The court
sentenced Darlene to a secure facility for a period not to exceed
her twenty-first birthday.10 3 In reversing this sentence, the su-
preme court held that under the Children's Code, the family
court could not sentence Darlene as a delinquent when she was,
in fact, merely a chronic status offender.1M However, the court
found that the family court may use its inherent contempt
power in extreme cases to incarcerate a status offender in a se-
cure facility for contempt, but not merely for the status
offense.105
The court reasoned that all tribunals, through the exercise
of their contempt power, possess the inherent ability to punish
those violating their orders. 06 Citing Curlee v. Howle,107 the
court noted that the contempt power is essential to the preserva-
tion of order in judicial proceedings and to the due administra-
tion of justice. Although the court acknowledged legislative con-
cern over commingling status offenders with juveniles who had
committed serious crimes, the court observed that the family
courts were performing an exercise in futility by placing chronic
runaways in nonsecure facilities.108 Pointing to language in the
Children's Code providing that it shall be interpreted in con-
junction with all relevant laws and regulations,10 9 the supreme
court reasoned that this allowed family court to exercise its con-
tempt power to prevent repeated violations of its orders by run-
99. Id. Darlene had a long history of truancy and running away, and had appeared
in family court fourteen times over a two and one-half year span. Id. at 666, 301 S.E.2d
at 137-38.
100. Id. at 665, 301 S.E.2d at 137.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 666, 301 S.E.2d at 137.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 667, 301 S.E.2d at 138.
105. The case was remanded for resentencing. Id. at 668, 301 S.E.2d at 138.
106. 278 S.C. at 666, 301 S.E.2d at 137.
107. 277 S.C. 377, 287 S.E.2d 915 (1982).
108. 278 S.C. at 667, 301 S.E.2d at 138.
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 36
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away juveniles.110
The court cited L.A.M. v. State,"' which establishes the
four elements necessary to a finding of contempt: (1) the exis-
tence of a valid order directing the alleged contennor to do or
refrain from doing something and the court's jurisdiction to
enter that order; (2) the contemnor's notice of the order with
sufficient time to comply with it; (3) the contemnor's ability to
comply with the order; and (4) the contemnor's willful failure to
comply with the order.
11 2
The decision in Darlene C. is modeled closely upon the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. L.E.A. v.
Hammergren.13 This decision is significant because it further
defines the "willful failure to comply" element of the offense of
contempt. The court in Hammergren held that a "willful failure
to comply" requires the record from the previous hearing to
show that the child understood that disobedience would result
in incarceration. The court then emphasized that the contempt
power could be used to incarcerate status offenders only in the
most egregious circumstances in which all less restrictive alter-
natives have previously failed.11 4 In addition, the court in Ham-
mergren required that the court instruct the administrator of
the secure institution that the disobedient child's contact with
more hardened juveniles should be kept at a minimum.1 15 With
the exception of the requirement of orders to the administrator,
Darlene C. adopts all the guidelines established in Hammergren.
By engrafting these limitations, Darlene C. attempts to strictly
circumscribe the family court's discretion to invoke the con-
tempt power.
110. 278 S.C. at 667, 301 S.E.2d at 138.
111. 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska, 1976). Although the result reached in L.A.M. is consis-
tent with Darlene C., the approach of the Supreme Court of Alaska was somewhat differ-
ent. First, the court held that willful criminal contempt of the court's order elevated the
minor's status to that of a juvenile delinquent. Id. at 836. Second, the court considered
the environment of the secure facility to which L.A.M would be sent, and concluded
that it was more like a juvenile hall and that L.AM. would not be distinguishable in
sophistication from the average child there. Id. at 835. Finally, the court noted that
Alaska had a practice of sending hard-core delinquents to juvenile security institutions
in other states. Id.
112. 278 S.C. at 667, 301 S.E.2d at 138.
113. 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980).
114. Id. at 707-08.
115. Id.
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Jurisdictions rejecting the use of the contempt power to in-
carcerate status offenders have recognized that courts may not
use a bootstrapping procedure to accomplish indirectly that
which they cannot accomplish directly.116 In re Ronald S.117 con-
cerned a thirteen year old status offender, classified under the
California Welfare and Institutions Code"" as a "section 601"
status offender, who was declared a ward of the state and or-
dered to a nonsecure facility. He immediately escaped from the
center, and the juvenile court found that this act elevated his
status to that of a section 602 juvenile delinquent. The court
sentenced Ronald to a secure facility." 9 In reversing, the court
of appeal held that in the face of a clear legislative mandate
prohibiting the placement of status offenders in secure facili-
ties, 120 the court had no authority to depart from what the legis-
lature had ordained.' 2' Through its colorful account of the pro-
ceedings in juvenile court 22 and its honest admission of the
116. See In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977); W.M. v.
State, 437 N.E.2d 1028 (Ind. 1982); In re M.S., 73 N.J. 238, 374 A.2d 445 (1977); In re
Tasseing H., 281 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rpts. 400, 422 A.2d 530 (1980).
117. 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977).
118. The California Welfare and Institutions Code divides the children of juvenile
court into three types: (1) section 600 children, who are dependent children, often vic-
tims of cruelty, abuse, neglect or depravity; (2) section 601 children, who are status of-
fenders; and (3) section 602 children, who are juvenile criminal law violators. 69 Cal.
App. 3d at 869, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
119. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 507(b) (Deering 1983) (repealed 1984), prohibited
the placement of section 601 status offenders in secure facilities.
121. The language through which the court expressed its holding is especially
interesting:
While it may seem ridiculous to place a runaway in a nonsecure setting, never-
theless, that is what the Legislature has ordained. The Legislature has deter-
mined that 601's shall not be detained in or committed to secure institutions
even if this makes juvenile court judges look ridiculous .... [Als the law now
stands, the Legislature has said that if a 601 wants to run, let him run. While
this may be maddening, baffling and annoying to the juvenile court judge, ours
is not to question the wisdom of the Legislature.
69 Cal. App. 3d at 873-74, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99.
122. Id. at 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392. While Ronald S. and Darlene C. are similar on
their facts, the reasoning of the courts involved is somewhat different. In Ronald S., the
lower court found the juvenile guilty of contempt, adjudicated the minor delinquent, and
confined him to a secure facility. The family court in Darlene C. did the same. On ap-
peal, both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal disap-
proved of these actions. The California court went on to hold, however, that under no
circumstances could state juvenile courts confine a minor to a secure facility given a clear
legislative directive to the contrary. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that while
18
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futility of placing "fleet footed 601's" in nonsecure facilities, 12 3
the court in Ronald S. pleaded convincingly for legislative action
in this matter. The court suggested three alternatives: (1) the
legislature could remove itself entirely from the matter of child
welfare;"' (2) the legislature could place the problem in the
hands of another governmental agency which provides counsel-
ing services in youth hostels to which runaways could come vol-
untarily;12 5 or (3) the legislature could remove the prohibition
against detaining status offenders in secure facilities. 26
Legislative action may not be the only solution available.
When the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the detention
of chronic status offenders in secure facilities in In re M.S.,127
the court noted that the unauthorized departure from a non-
secure facility was symptomatic of the very problem for which
shelter care was being provided. 128 The court reasoned that the
process of using the contempt remedy to incarcerate status of-
fenders in secure facilities not only threatened such children
with exposure to hardcore delinquents, but also conferred a stig-
matizing criminal status on the child now adjudged a delin-
quent.129 While concurring in the belief that statutory reform
may be necessary,13 0 the court in In re M.S. suggested that a
solution lay in the exercise of stricter supervision and control of
the status offenders by the personnel in the nonsecure
facilities.1"1
the family court may not use the contempt power as a means of adjudicating a minor
delinquent, it may sentence a juvenile to a secure facility for up to six months as a
contemnor, although not as a delinquent. In making this decision, the court reasoned
that it was merely construing the Children's Code in the context of all relevant law and
not undermining its direct prohibition against confining minors in secure facilities.
123. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 872, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
124. Id. at 874, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
125. Id., 138 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
126. Id. at 875, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The court stated that contacts between status
offenders and juvenile delinquents could still be avoided by simply providing in some
instances that existing nonsecure facilities serve as secure facilities. Id.
127. 73 N.J. 238, 274 A.2d 445 (1977).
128. Id. at 244, 274 A.2d at 448. The court continued, "It would be incongruous to
classify a juvenile as a delinquent for the same kind of conduct which under the Act
constitutes him or her as being in need of supervision only." Id. at 245, 274 A.2d at 449.
129. Id. It could be argued that the reasoning of the court in In re M.S. was not
applicable to Darlene C. in that the court in Darlene C. specifically disapproved the use
of the contempt power to adjudicate a minor delinquent. See supra note 122.
130. 73 N.J. at 246, 274 A.2d at 449.
131. Id., 274 A.2d at 448.
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The reluctance on the part of many state legislatures to pro-
vide secure placement for status offenders is a response to the
national drive for the deinstitutionalization of nondelinquent
children which was underscored by the passage of the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA).132  The
JJDPA, enacted in 1974, requires that states accepting funds
under the Act demonstrate efforts to remove status offenders
from secure facilities and to develop alternative programs to
meet their needs.33 Recent amendments to the JJDPA give
some support to the court's decision in Darlene C. Although
deinstitutionalization remains the primary focus of the Act, the
1980 amendment to section 223(a)(12)(A) permits secure deten-
tion of status offenders who violate valid court orders.'" The
South Carolina legislature, therefore, could remain within the
JJDPA funding guidelines if it authorized the detention of sta-
tus offenders who violate such orders. The JJDPA guidelines do
not address the issue of altering the characterization of a chronic
status offender to that of a delinquent. Presumably, however,
the legislature could opt to provide several levels of secure facili-
ties and still maintain the distinction between status offenders
and juvenile delinquents.3 5
Those in charge of a shelter care facility stand in loco parents of a [status
offender] in their custody and would be entitled to exercise the parental con-
trol necessary to safeguard the [child's] own welfare. The firm exercise of au-
thority, closer supervision, and the use of shelter areas where going and coming
can be more easily observed should in most cases provide adequate means of
controlling unauthorized departures.
Id., 274 A.2d at 448.
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5640 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979), as amended by Juvenile Jus-
tice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-509, 94 Stat. 2750.
133. Under the Act,
[Participating states must] submit annual reports to the Associate Administra-
tor containing a review of the progress made by the State to achieve the dein-
stitutionalization of juveniles . . . and a review of the progress made by the
State to provide that such juveniles, if placed in facilities, are placed in facili-
ties which (i) are the least restrictive alternatives appropriate to the needs of
the child and the community; ....
42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(B) (Supp. HI 1979).
134. The 1980 Amendment provides, in part, that, "[J]uveniles who are charged
with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an
adult or offenses which do not constitute violations of valid court orders ... shall not
be placed in secure detention facilities ... " 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (Supp. 1979)
(emphasis added).
135. The legislative history of the amendment indicates, however, that a status of-
fender detained under § 223(a)(12)(A) ought to have been the subject of an order of civil
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If the General Assembly enacts provisions pertaining to the
placement of a status offender in a secure facility, it may look
for guidance to a former Indiana statute313 mentioned by the
court in Darlene C. This statute provided that a runaway violat-
ing a valid court order could be placed in a secure facility only if
the child's physical and mental condition would be endangered
by not placing him there; even then, the child could be placed
only in a licensed private facility or a correctional facility that
did not house delinquents, unless such housing was unavailable.
Moreover, the placement was to be reviewed every three months
to determine whether placement in a secure facility remained
appropriate. Such a legislative response allows the court to en-
force its orders while alleviating the problem of commingling
status offenders with juvenile delinquents. This solution to the
chronic runaway problem also seems consistent with the aims of
the Children's Code.
In conclusion, the court in Darlene C. extended the family
court's inherent contempt power to the disposition of matters
involving status offenders who repeatedly violate the orders of
the family court. The supreme court held that despite an ex-
press statutory provision to the contrary, the contempt power
may be used to detain status offenders in secure facilities. The
court justified its judicial activism on the basis of the legisla-
ture's failure to address the problem of chronic status offenders,
thus reflecting the court's commitment to oversee the welfare of
the children of South Carolina when another branch of govern-
ment has made inadequate provision.
contempt. Rep. Ashbrook contended that the amendment would allow family courts to
treat violations of their orders by issuing contempt citations, thereby allowing judicial
responses to such violations within the context of civil proceedings. He stated that the
amendment's purpose was to help the courts "respond to youth who chronically refuse
voluntary treatment." 126 CONG. REc. H10, 936-38 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980).
136. 1982 IND. ACTs P.L. 184 § 1. This has been subsequently repealed and replaced
by IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-15.4 (Supp. 1983), which does not provide for incarceration
of status offenders.
1984]
21
Pillick: Domestic Relations
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
III. FAMILY COURT PROCEDURE
A. The Requirement for Specific Pleading of Lump Sum
Alimony in Default Cases
In Harris v. Harris,137 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the family court exceeded its authority by granting a
lump sum award of alimony based upon a default judgment
when the petitioner failed to include a specific prayer for such
an award in her petition. Displaying strict adherence to section
15-35-70 of the Code,138 the court indicated that in divorce ac-
tions, a general prayer for alimony provides insufficient notice to
a defendant for a subsequent lump sum alimony award. The de-
cision creates an exception to the practice of liberally construing
the terms of a petitioner's prayer in order to award any relief
appropriate to the pleadings, 139 and imposes a limitation on the
discretion of the family court in default divorce cases.
The husband in Harris was served with a summons and a
petition requesting support for the wife, an order directing a sale
of the marital residence and division of the proceeds, as well as
attorney's fees. 140 No answer was made to the petition, and five
months later the husband was served with an amended petition
which differed from the original only in the addition of a de-
mand for a divorce on the ground of one year's separation. 4 '
The actual prayer was not so amended. The husband made no
reply to the amended petition, was unrepresented at trial, and
was found in default.1 42 Based on this finding, the family court
awarded the wife the following: (1) a divorce; (2) a lump sum
alimony award of ten thousand dollars, with the alternative op-
tion of transferring the husband's undivided one-half interest in
the marital home to the wife; (3) a division of personal property;
and (4) attorney's fees. 43 Subsequently, the husband moved to
137. 279 S.C. 148, 303 S.E.2d 97 (1983).
138. This section provides in pertinent part that- "The relief granted to the plain-
tiff, if there be no answer cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his com-
plaint. . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-37-70 (1976).
139. See Sheppard v. Green, 48 S.C. 165, 26 S.E. 224 (1897).
140. 279 S.C. at 149, 303 S.E.2d at 98. In addition, a temporary restraining order
prohibiting interference by the husband was requested and granted. Id.
141. Id. at 150, 303 S.E.2d at 98-99.
142. Record at 2.
143. 279 S.C. at 151, 303 S.E.2d at 99.
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vacate the decree and reopen the default judgment pursuant to
South Carolina Code section 14-27-130,144 claiming that the
judgment was taken against him by surprise in that the default
decree went beyond the relief demanded in the petition.145 The
trial court denied the motion to vacate the default decree, but
on appeal, the supreme court reversed. Citing Hopkins v. Hop-
kins,146 the court held that the petitioner in a default case is
strictly limited in his recovery to the express terms of his
prayer. 147 The rationale underlying this doctrine is that, as a
matter of due process and proper notice, a defendant has the
right to assume the judgment will be limited to the cause of ac-
tion in the complaint.
148
In Harris, the court was called upon to consider for the first
144. This section provides, in part: "The court may... relieve a party from a judg-
ment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any proceeding." S.C. CoDE
ANN. § 15-27-130 (1976).
145. The husband also leveled a two-pronged jurisdictional attack, which was re-
jected by the court. First, the husband argued that the summons was fatally defective in
that it was signed in violation of Family Court Rule 6 which provides that "every sum-
mons shall be countersigned by the clerk or the judge." The court noted that § 14-17-60
empowers a qualified "deputy [to] do . . . any and all the duties appertaining to the
office of the principal." 279 S.C. at 150, 303 S.E.2d at 98. Second, the husband asserted
that the amended petition constituted a conversion of the action from one for support
and maintenance to one for divorce. Relying upon § 15-13-920(d) of the Code, which
prohibits amendments which "change substantially the claim or defense," the husband
argued that the revision should have taken the form of a supplemental pleading under §
15-13-100, entitling the husband to a new summons for the purposes of the amended
petition. The court elected to construe the amended petition as an amendment before
trial, simply recasting the issue to be decided, in accordance with the liberal attitude
toward amendments before trial established by Vernon v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 218
S.C. 402, 63 S.E.2d 53 (1951).
146. 266 S.C. 23, 221 S.E.2d 113 (1975) (where the petition in a divorce proceeding
requested only a divorce, an order awarding the wife a conveyance of the house and
furniture in lieu of alimony was improper in a default judgment).
147. Comparing the specific terms of the prayer with the decree, the court con-
cluded that family court was without authority to grant the divorce, make a lump sum
alimony award, or divide personal property. The court upheld the award of attorney's
fees. 279 S.C. at 152, 303 S.E.2d at 99-100.
148. See Pruitt v. Taylor, 247 N.C. 380, 100 S.E.2d 841 (1957); 47 AN. JUR. 2D Judg-
ments §§ 1175-76 (1969). Concerning the possible due process implications of a default
judgment taken without sufficient notice, the court in Richardson Constr. Co. v. Meek
Engineering and Constr., Inc., 274 S.C. 307, 262 S.E.2d 913 (1980), vacated a default
judgment taken in a Summons (Complaint not Served) and observed that it had never
before had the opportunity to consider whether the granting of a default judgment on a
Summons (Complaint not Served) might violate due process. Id. at 310 n.1, 262 S.E.2d at
916 n.1.
23
Pillick: Domestic Relations
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
time the propriety in a default case, of awarding lump sum ali-
mony based only on a general prayer for alimony. In holding
that such a general prayer does not justify a subsequent lump
sum award, the court in Harris appeared to voice a preference
for periodic payments.1 49 The decision does not divest the family
court of its discretion under section 20-3-40150 of the Code to
order lump sum or periodic alimony in contested actions, or to
award lump sum alimony in default cases where such an award
is requested in the prayer. However, Harris suggests that practi-
tioners requesting a lump sum award of alimony should be pre-
pared to demonstrate the existence of "special facts and circum-
stances.1 51 An examination of the court's prior awards of lump
sum alimony reveals several factors prompting a finding of spe-
cial facts and circumstances, such as delinquency in prior sup-
port payments, 52 a demonstrated or declared unwillingness to
provide periodic payments, 53 predicted dissipation of the defen-
149. The court in Harris noted, "Reflection upon prior cases in which we have re-
viewed awards of lump-sum alimony leads us to conclude that such awards are generally
supported by special facts and circumstances." 279 S.C. at 152, 303 S.E.2d at 100. The
clear implication from this statement is that the general pattern will be to award peri-
odic alimony. See CLARK, LAW OF Domaasnxc RELATIONS § 14.5, at 447 (1968).
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-40 (1976).
151. See supra note 149.
152. In two cases the court has considered an award of lump sum alimony appropri-
ate when the husband was delinquent in payments due under a previous temporary or-
der of support. In McCullough v. McCullough, 271 S.C. 475, 248 S.E.2d 308 (1978), fam-
ily court awarded the wife approximately $14,000 lump sum alimony, consisting of one-
third of a savings account owned by the husband plus over $12,000 in shares of stock.
The divorce decree stated that the award included all accrued amounts due under a prior
support order. The husband challenged the amount of the award as excessive. In uphold-
ing the award, the court noted that special circumstances supported an award of lump
sum rather than periodic alimony. Id. at 477, 248 S.E.2d at 307.
In Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323 (1963), the wife brought a suit
in South Carolina for divorce and alimony. While this action was pending, the husband
obtained a divorce in Kentucky, which decree awarded no alimony. The circuit court,
concurring in the findings of a special referee, found that the Kentucky decree dissolved
the marriage but was not a bar to the wife's claim to alimony. The supreme court af-
firmed. The court held that they were not bound to give full faith and credit to a Ken-
tucky decree providing for no alimony. In response to the husband's argument that the
payment of $4,250 lump sum alimony was inappropriate, the court noted that the hus-
band was already in contempt of court for failing to make payments pendente lite as
ordered by the court, and that as the court already had jurisdiction over the husband
and his property, a lump sum payment was justified. Id. at 225, 133 S.E.2d at 326.
153. An exhibition or declaration of unwillingness to provide periodic support has
led the court to uphold a lump sum alimony award. In Jones v. Jones, 270 S.C. 280, 241
S.E.2d 904 (1978), the wife received a divorce on the grounds of physical cruelty and
24
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dant's estate,'5 and wealth or sizeable assets on the defendant's
part.
155
The lesson emerging from Harris is twofold. First, the case
should serve to warn practitioners that if a lump sum award of
alimony is desired, it should be specifically pleaded, inasmuch as
a failure to do so precludes such relief should default occur. Sec-
ond, Harris may be seen as a signal from the South Carolina
Supreme Court to practitioners that requests for lump sum
awards of alimony should be accompanied by a showing of spe-
cial facts and circumstances.
B. Compliance with Family Court Rule 27(C)
In Atkinson v. Atkinson,58 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that where a family court order granting a divorce
and other relief failed to comply with Family Court Rule 27(C),
and where the record was insufficient to permit adequate appel-
late review, the case should be remanded to the family court.
Rule 27(C) requires that, "The Order... shall set forth the sa-
lient facts upon which the order is granted, the conclusions of
habitual drunkenness. The decree gave the wife a $36,000 lump sum alimony award. On
appeal the husband challenged only the form, not the amount, of the alimony. The court
sustained the lump sum award, relying on the wife's testimony that the husband, who
had moved to North Carolina to evade support orders, had stated he would leave the
country before supporting his family. As a further ground to uphold the lump sum
award, the court concluded that the husband's habitual drunkennness threatened dis-
sipation of his estate.
154. See supra note 153.
155. In Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977), the husband ob-
tained a divorce in Florida, and sought to interpose the Florida decree as an absolute bar
to the wife's action in South Carolina for alimony and attorney's fees. The trial court,
which found that the Florida decree dissolved the marriage, awarded the wife no alimony
or attorney's fees. The supreme court agreed that the Florida decree dissolved the mar-
riage, but held that under the "divisible divorce" doctrine of Murdock v. Murdock, see
supra note 152, the wife could maintain an independent action for alimony and attor-
ney's fees. In reviewing the respective necessities of the parties and other factors sup-
porting an alimony award, the court emphasized that the husband had an estate exceed-
ing four million dollars, and that the wife, who admittedly had made no contributions
toward this wealth, had previously enjoyed a high standard of living. The court rejected
both the trial court's determination that the wife was not entitled to alimony, and the
findings of a master that a $15,000 lump sum award was sufficient. The case was re-
manded for a determination of a reasonable amount of alimony as well as of the propri-
ety of one lump sum payment.
156. 279 S.C. 355, 309 S.E.2d 14 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983).
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law, and. . . other data relating to the decision .. ,15 Since
the responsibility for preparing family court orders often falls on
practitioners, it is important that practitioners as well as the
family court bench be advised not only of the court of appeals'
marked intolerance toward insufficient or conclusory orders, but
also of the guidelines established in the opinion.
In Atkinson, the family court declared a Nevada divorce de-
cree null and void and granted the wife a divorce from her hus-
band on the ground of adultery. Other relief was granted, in-
cluding: (1) child support; (2) lump sum alimony in the amount
of ten thousand dollars, with an alternative option of conveying
part of the husband's interest in the marital home to the wife;
(3) monthly house payments; (4) reimbursement of one thou-
sand dollars of expenses incurred by the wife; (5) equitable dis-
tribution; and (6) attorney's fees. The husband appealed, as-
signing error with respect to all relief granted by family court.
Noting the difficulty of performing an appellate review on an in-
adequate record,15 the court found none of the legal conclusions
to be supported by sufficient findings of fact.
The court then proceeded to review all the relief granted by
family court and to establish the factual considerations affecting
the legal conclusion. With respect to the husband's argument
that the Nevada divorce decree be accorded full faith and credit,
the court directed the family court to consider the ramifications
of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 5 9 as interpreted by the
prior decision in Powers v. Powers. 60
157. S.C. FAMILY CT. R. 27(C). In Atkinson the court cited Rule 27(3) as the rele-
vant statute; however, a 1983 amendment to Rule 27, applicable April 15, 1983,
redesignated former paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as (A), (B), and (C) respectively. Thus,
the court's decision was based upon the current Rule 27(C).
158. 279 S.C. at 357, 309 S.E.2d at 15. "Proper appellate review is extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, where a lower court order omits specific findings of fact to sup-
port its legal conclusions .... [W]e believe that strict compliance with [Rule 27(C)] pro-
motes the administration of justice at every judicial level." Id.
159. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-410 (1976).
160. 273 S.C. 51, 254 S.E.2d 289 (1979). In Powers, a husband who testified he went
to Nevada for the express purpose of obtaining a divorce decree failed to overcome the
statutory presumption of a South Carolina domicile when his Nevada proceedings began.
The statute under which the presumption in Powers arose is now codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-3-430 (1976). It provides that upon proof that a party obtaining a foreign
divorce was domiciled in South Carolina within twelve months prior to the commence-
ment of the proceeding, and resumed residence within eighteen months after the date of
his departure, or that a party at all times after his departure and until his return main-
[Vol. 36
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The court then examined several prior cases addressing the
standard of proof for adultery. 1 The general principles emerg-
ing from these cases suggest that although eyewitness testimony
is not required, any indirect or circumstantial evidence must be
reasonably definite as to time and place and must not be based
on mere speculation.
With respect to an award of support payments, such as
monthly mortgage, insurance, tax, and reimbursement to the
wife of certain expenses, the court cited Grubbs v. Grubbs,'6 2 in-
dicating that any salient facts supporting payments incident to
further support must demonstrate that such payments are not
excessively burdensome. 63 The court in Grubbs, however, re-
versed an award of $65,000 to the wife, which represented reim-
bursement to the wife for prior services rendered in the hus-
band's business, where the pleadings and record did not
evidence any request for such relief. The court also noted that
the wife's interest in the business was represented by a twenty
percent ownership interest.'" Therefore, the decision in Grubbs
to deny the wife reimbursement was narrowly drawn and should
not be construed as a bar to such relief when properly pleaded,
supported in the record, and not subsumed by some larger pro-
prietary interest.
The court in Atkinson also dealt with the necessary factual
findings regarding alimony and child support. The court cata-
tained a South Carolina residence, there is prima facie evidence that the party was domi-
ciled in South Carolina when the foreign divorce proceeding commenced.
161. See Fox v. Fox, 277 S.C. 400, 288 S.E.2d 390 (1982) (evidence placing husband
and third party together on several occasions, without more, did not warrant a conclu-
sion of adultery); Wingate v. Wingate, 272 S.C. 489, 252 S.E.2d 916 (1979) (eyewitness
testimony to sexual act and admission of close social relationship between parties, cor-
roborated by other evidence of adulterous conduct, warrants finding of adultery); Odom
v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353 (1966) (although proof of adultery must be suffi-
ciently definite to establish time and place of offense and circumstances under which
committed, adultery can be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence); Brown v.
Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949) (direct proof of adultery by eyewitness evi-
dence not required).
162. 272 S.C. 138, 249 S.E.2d 747 (1978).
163. In Grubbs, the parties were denied a divorce, but were granted a legal separa-
tion. The supreme court upheld a child support award of $592, which included $292 per
month for mortgage payments. The single factor mentioned by the court in sustaining
the mortgage payments was the fact that the husband was a wealthy man engaged in a
profitable business enterprise. Id. at 142, 249 S.E.2d at 749.
164. Id.
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logued four areas in which the family court should make specific
findings of fact before determining the level of child support: (1)
the needs of each minor child; (2) the incomes, earning capaci-
ties, and assets of both parents; (3) the health, age, and general
physical condition of both parents; and (4) the necessities and
living expenses of both parents.65
The court held that the family court must make specific
findings of fact regarding ten critical factors concerning alimony
awards:""6 (1) the financial condition or status of the spouse obli-
gated to pay alimony; (2) the needs of the party to receive the
alimony; (3) the health and ages of both parties; (4) the earning
capacity of each party; (5) the actual income of each party; (6)
the individual contributions to the accumulation of their joint
wealth; (7) the standard of living of both parties at the time of
the divorce; (8) the duration of the marriage; (9) the conduct of
the parties; and (10) the special circumstances making any
award of lump sum alimony appropriate.6 7
In determining the appropriate property division, the court
held that the family court should make specific findings of fact
concerning a number of factors. These were: the relative incomes
of the parties, the material contributions of the parties to the
acquisition of the marital property, and the weight accorded by
the court to these contributions. 6 "
165. 279 S.C. at 357, 309 S.E.2d at 15.
166. Id. at 357-58, 309 S.E.2d at 15.
167. For factors supporting a lump sum alimony award, see Burgess v. Burgess, 277
S.C. 283, 286 S.E.2d 142 (1982); Jones v. Jones, 270 S.C. 280, 241 S.E.2d 904 (1972);
Nienow v. Nienow, 263 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977). See also supra text accompany-
ing footnotes 149-55.
168. 279 S.C. at 358, 309 S.E.2d at 16. The court cited several cases applying these
factors in a variety of circumstances.
In Burgess v. Burgess, 277 S.C. 283, 286 S.E.2d 142 (1982), the court held that a
special equity award of $10,000 to the wife was insufficient where the wife had made
material contributions to the acquisition of the property, but the husband was awarded
the marital residence valued at $47,000, as well as substantial personalty. The court fur-
ther noted that the husband's income was over nine times that of the wife. Also of signif-
icance in Burgess was the court's statement that the property division award is only one
of several factors to be considered in determining alimony, and may not be a substitute
for alimony. Burgess also indicates that interspousal gifts are subject to property
division.
In Bugg v. Bugg, 277 S.C. 270, 286 S.E.2d 135 (1982), the court found that a $10,000
property division award to the wife was inadequate where the wife had worked for ap-
proximately 16 years during the marriage. In Bugg, the court found the property division
award inadequate even though the husband was unable to work due to a mental illness,
[Vol. 36
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Finally, the court delineated six factors to be considered in
determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees:
(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the legal services ren-
dered; (2) the time and labor necessarily devoted to the case; (3)
the professional standing of counsel; (4) the contingency of com-
pensation; (5) the beneficial results accomplished; and (6) the
fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.169
Atkinson emphasizes the importance of carefully written
family court orders. In drafting such orders, the domestic bench
and bar should take care to incorporate those key factors high-
lighted by the court in establishing the salient facts supporting
the relief granted.
Aleta M. Pillick
whereas the wife was employed full-time and enjoyed good health. However, the court
agreed that such factors justified denying the wife alimony. Relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the South Carolina court
also held that military retirement pay was not subject to equitable distribution in a di-
vorce proceeding.
In Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980), the court indicated that
an adulterous wife who had made material contributions to the acquisition of marital
property could not be barred from a special equity award, although she could be denied
alimony. While the Simmons decision made clear that adultery cannot justify a total
divestment of a special equity interest, it "is one of a panoply of considerations", id. at
44, 267 S.E.2d at 429, in determining the respective shares of the parties.
In Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 366 (1978), where the wife failed to
produce sufficient evidence to prevail under a resulting trust theory, the court applied
the special equity theory. This theory gives the wife an equitable interest in marital
property where she has made a material contribution to the acquisition of property dur-
ing the marriage. In Wilson the wife had worked for 24 years of the marriage, contribut-
ing substantially to the material success of the family and freeing the husband's earnings
for investment.
169. 279 S.C. at 358-59, 309 S.E.2d at 16. See also Degelman v. Degelman, 276 S.C.
600, 281 S.E.2d 123 (1981) (where lower court failed to make specific findings of fact
regarding factors supporting award of attorney's fees, case remanded to receive addi-
tional evidence pertaining to such relief); Nienow v. Nienow, 263 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d
504 (1977) (establishing the factors cited in Atkinson as the relevant factors supporting
an award of attorney's fees). See also S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 32, DR 2-106(B) (1980) (establish-
ing factors determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees).
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